http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=37514
2010-02-26
Parallels of Conquest, Past and Present
Like William the Conqueror who ignored the English battlefield dead, the US government has not identified – nor even made a good-faith effort to estimate – the number of Iraqis and Afghanis who have been killed. By suppressing the human toll, the war still can be sold as benefiting the Iraqi people. The reality of their intense suffering, however, is much different from the generally positive image that US propagandists seek to present, notes Douglas Valentine.
After the Battle of Hastings in 1066, William the Conqueror’s army buried its fallen comrades, but left the corpses of the English defenders to rot in the fields.
Such is the brutal nature of war: the victor inflicts all manner of suffering and humiliation on the vanquished. Nearly a millennium later, what the United States is doing in Iraq and Afghanistan is only marginally different.
William the Conqueror made no pretense about his brutal subjugation of the English. They hated him and resisted his occupation for 20 years, during which time he took their property and gave it to the Norman upper class.
Over 300,000 English people were murdered and starved (one fifth of the population) and some 300,000 French and Normans were planted in England in positions of authority.
During the repression, an English nobleman was likely blinded, castrated, and thrown into a dungeon in one of the hundreds of castles that William built across the countryside to defend Norman interests. The overall strategy was to eliminate native leadership and to terrorize the population into submission.
By the time William repented his sins on his deathbed in 1087, England had ceased being England.
While the US-led occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan are different in many details, there are disturbing parallels in the extent of the carnage and the strategy of coercion, in the innocent blood that has flowed and the number of survivors who have been terrorized.
Like William the Conqueror who ignored the English battlefield dead, the US government has not identified – nor even made a good-faith effort to estimate – the number of Iraqis and Afghanis who have been killed.
That’s because the Bush administration – and now the Obama administration – have had an official policy of not counting the number of people killed, crippled, rendered homeless, starved, or condemned to disease and possibly insanity.
US government officials have claimed that this policy has been followed to escape the “body count” mindset that became notorious during the Vietnam War. But it also has made it impossible to quantitatively measure the amount of misery that US policymakers have inflicted on Iraq and Afghanistan.
The lack of official numbers also has enabled the US government to cast doubt on unofficial estimates that put the number of Iraqi dead in the hundreds of thousands or possibly over one million. Most reports in the mainstream US news media cite much lower estimates, presumably to avoid offending the powers-that-be in Washington.
Out of the Press
As much as possible, US leaders have sought to keep the ugliness of these wars – the mangled bodies, the burned-off faces, the squalid refugee camps, the abused captives – out of the press and away from the public’s consciousness, thus to preserve the pretense of moral superiority that defines American “exceptionalism.”
But the principal advantage of having no official casualty estimates and few photos of atrocities in Iraq is that the American people aren’t reminded of the horrendous consequences of a war launched by President George W. Bush under the false claim that Iraq possessed WMD stockpiles.
By suppressing the human toll, the war still can be sold as benefiting the Iraqi people. The reality of their intense suffering, however, is much different from the generally positive image that US propagandists seek to present.
And that is one big difference between the slaughter of Englishmen by William the Conqueror and the carnage unleashed by George W. Bush, the modern-day conqueror. William’s cruelty was done in the light of day.
Yet, it is not as if the US government doesn’t keep tabs on those killed, maimed or rendered as orphans. The government simply doesn’t want the American people to know the quantity or the specifics, all the better to strip the two conflicts of their human dimensions.
In Afghanistan, for example, the CIA and military have been conducting a census of every village, town and city in the country – much like William’s infamous Doomsday (or Domesday) Book, which assessed the property of every English landowner for the purpose of levying taxes or confiscation.
As commander of the US occupation army, General Stanley McChrystal wants to know the name of every Afghan, so his analysts can decide who is a Taliban and who is not, or in the even vaguer vernacular favored by the US military, who are the “bad guys.”
McChrystal’s survey seeks to determine where each man lives, how many people are in his family, who his wife and children and relatives are, where he works and where his property is.
In places like Marjah, considered a Taliban stronghold where a US-led offensive is currently underway, McChrystal is at a bit of a loss, but he still tries to obtain actionable intelligence through networks of spies and via all manner of electronic surveillance, including satellites.
Tracking the Taliban
This biographical information and other data about Afghanis are entered into a computer in McChrystal’s office, where the material is carefully monitored by the CIA and military special operations units.
Within a separate folder for suspected Taliban, every man is identified by the same biographical criteria as every other Afghan. In addition, each Taliban is categorized by his rank and position within the organization.
Low-level fighters are left to the Marines, while “high-value targets” get their own folder and are handled by the CIA and military special operations.
These “high-value targets” are given the kind of special attention that William the Conqueror reserved for English noblemen, who were viewed as especially important to kill or otherwise neutralize in order to pacify the countryside.
“High-value targets” in Afghanistan have the property (intellectual as well as physical, such as opium fields) that McChrystal wants to deny the Taliban. So, more biographical information is gathered about them, and their movements are tracked 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
Through spies and sophisticated electronic surveillance, McChrystal even has a very good idea when they are leaving one safe house and traveling to another. The jets are fueled, and the drones are in the sky, waiting.
And this is how and why 27 Afghan civilians were slaughtered on Feb. 21 while traveling between remote provinces in a caravan of minibuses. The CIA and military special operations forces were alerted that some “high-value target” was traveling with his family, and McChrystal seized the opportunity to kill them all.
In a dirty war like the one in Afghanistan, killing “high-value targets” almost always involves murdering them while they are at home or while traveling with their families; otherwise they are much less accessible and thus harder targets.
Killing enemy leaders along with their entire families has a psychological-warfare impact, too, putting this secret policy under the intelligence rubric of “black propaganda.”
It is psychological warfare because these mass killings have a sobering effect on low-level Taliban who wish to rise in the ranks. It is a form of propaganda that every Afghan citizen is aware of, and it is “black” because it is not officially acknowledged, keeping the American people in the dark.
The mainstream US news media plays along by rarely citing the obvious facts of this dirty war. The killing of civilians is dismissed as an accident that is accompanied by a routine apology from General McChrystal or some other US spokesman.
Savagery, Past and Present
Though US media propagandists treat McChrystal as an honorable and hard-working warrior, the truth is that he is no less savage than William the Conqueror. Both spread terror by killing their enemies, dismembering bodies and inflicting death and cruelty on non-combatants as well.
The primary difference is that William and his army did their killing up close with battle axes and swords for everyone to see, while McChrystal and his high-tech killing machine inflict carnage from far away with 2,000-pound bombs or with missiles fired from drones – and then cloak the horror behind censorship and propaganda.
These cover-ups are essential because the American public might otherwise bolt against Washington’s imperial adventures, which often end up with working-class American soldiers dead or maimed while US corporations snake away with valuable resources from the conquered countries or otherwise use them for economic or geopolitical ends.
This strategy works because most Americans don’t know – and many may not care to know – the names and biographies of the victims.
Douglas Valentine is author of The Phoenix Program as well as The Strength of the Wolf and the new book Strength of the Pack. His Web site is DouglasValentine.com.
Monday, March 1, 2010
Saturday, February 27, 2010
Blackwater likely to receive contract
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/33544.html
By: Laura Rozen
February 26, 2010 05:07 AM EST
Former officials familiar with the deal say that Blackwater is likely to get a Defense Department-issued contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars to train and mentor Afghan police.
The police training contract is supposed to be decided next month, and the company has not been officially notified that it’s getting it. But the only competing bid for the contract, submitted by Northrop with MPRI, has been disqualified, a former official knowledgeable about the contract said.
“We have no knowledge that the contract will be awarded to us,” Mark Corallo, a spokesman for Blackwater, now known as Xe, told POLITICO Thursday.
Lockheed, meanwhile, is quite likely to be awarded an associated logistics contract to support the Afghanistan police training effort (a contract known as TORP 166), for which Blackwater also bid, the former officials said.
While a Blackwater subsidiary’s activities in Afghanistan were the subject of a scathing hearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee Wednesday, the U.S. Central Command and the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, are said to be very happy with the company’s work in Afghanistan, the former official familiar with the contracting deal told POLITICO. Blackwater has contracts to do intelligence support, counternarcotics support (with the Drug Enforcement Administration) and work on the Afghan-Pakistani border, the former official said.
The DoD has five “primes” — companies eligible to bid on contracts in Afghanistan: Raytheon, Lockheed, Northrop, Arinc (owned by Carlyle) and Blackwater. Of those, only Blackwater bid for both parts of the Afghan police training contract — involving training/mentoring and logistics. Its only competitor for the logistics contract was Lockheed. The former official said the Army had Lockheed resubmit its proposal to make it more suitable for the logistics contract.
By: Laura Rozen
February 26, 2010 05:07 AM EST
Former officials familiar with the deal say that Blackwater is likely to get a Defense Department-issued contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars to train and mentor Afghan police.
The police training contract is supposed to be decided next month, and the company has not been officially notified that it’s getting it. But the only competing bid for the contract, submitted by Northrop with MPRI, has been disqualified, a former official knowledgeable about the contract said.
“We have no knowledge that the contract will be awarded to us,” Mark Corallo, a spokesman for Blackwater, now known as Xe, told POLITICO Thursday.
Lockheed, meanwhile, is quite likely to be awarded an associated logistics contract to support the Afghanistan police training effort (a contract known as TORP 166), for which Blackwater also bid, the former officials said.
While a Blackwater subsidiary’s activities in Afghanistan were the subject of a scathing hearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee Wednesday, the U.S. Central Command and the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, are said to be very happy with the company’s work in Afghanistan, the former official familiar with the contracting deal told POLITICO. Blackwater has contracts to do intelligence support, counternarcotics support (with the Drug Enforcement Administration) and work on the Afghan-Pakistani border, the former official said.
The DoD has five “primes” — companies eligible to bid on contracts in Afghanistan: Raytheon, Lockheed, Northrop, Arinc (owned by Carlyle) and Blackwater. Of those, only Blackwater bid for both parts of the Afghan police training contract — involving training/mentoring and logistics. Its only competitor for the logistics contract was Lockheed. The former official said the Army had Lockheed resubmit its proposal to make it more suitable for the logistics contract.
The death of a child or adult in Afghanistan is worth $1,500-$2,500
http://cbs13.com/wireapnational/The.price.of.2.1505077.html
Christopher Torchia
Associated Press
Fri, 19 Feb 2010 22:17 EST
The fallout of war has a price in southern Afghanistan.
U.S. Army units fighting the Taliban in Helmand province have a compensation system for any death, injury or damage to crops and buildings caused by American forces to Afghan civilians and their property.
The suffering of a population caught between combatants during the Afghan war is a politically sensitive issue, and NATO troops have sought to make amends for deadly airstrikes and other instances in which civilians were killed.
In turn, they accuse insurgents of using civilians as human shields, making it harder to distinguish between enemies and innocents. Financial compensation in desperately poor Afghanistan is at least one way to alleviate distress and show good intentions, military commanders say.
The American units carry a list that gives guidance on payouts:
The death of a child or adult is worth $1,500-$2,500, loss of limb and other injuries $600-$1,500, a damaged or destroyed vehicle $500-$2,500, and damage to a farmer's fields $50-$250.
The system is also useful for gathering intelligence on insurgents, says 1st Sgt. Gene Hicks of Tacoma, Washington.
The military pays villagers in local currency for information about the location of roadside bombs as well as "where they've seen people at, where they've seen people moving, where they've seen people shooting from," Hicks said.
His Alpha Company of 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Stryker Brigade has paid out nearly $500 so far, though they also have yet to compensate landowners for compounds they have occupied and turned into patrol bases. They have not had to pay any "condolence" payments for injury or loss of life.
One Afghan landowner stands to reap a windfall because his compound has been occupied by British, Canadian and American troops.
"They've all used the same compound," Hicks said. "So he gets his money from whoever's occupying his compound at the time."
It's not an exact science, but some Afghan civilians in the area of Badula Qulp, northeast of the contested Taliban stronghold of Marjah, have been quick to exploit it. In any casualty case, the Americans are mindful that they might be asked to compensate for the death of an insurgent, rather than a civilian.
"It's really kind of hard," Hicks said. "You have to determine whether the guy was a good guy or a bad guy. It's a benefit of the doubt kind of thing."
A few days ago, a company with the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment got into a firefight with the Taliban, and a helicopter destroyed a mosque from where troops had received fire. The 15-year-old son of the local religious figure died in the air strike; the U.S. military agreed to pay compensation in a meeting with village leaders, though commanders privately speculated that the son might have been a combatant.
At that meeting, one of the elders initially objected to the idea of putting a price on someone's death, or damage to a holy religious site. By the end of the meeting, the elders seemed content with the idea of a payout.
The compensation process requires completed claim forms, and is sometimes complicated by the fact that many villagers don't know how to write and can't sign their names. In that event, soldiers take their fingerprint on the document or photograph them with the form.
During a mission in neighboring Kandahar province, Alpha Company once ran into an enterprising man who showed them where to find a roadside bomb that could have caused serious damage to one of their Stryker infantry carriers. The man wouldn't settle for a few hundred dollars; he wanted the amount of the armored vehicle that had possibly been saved from destruction - a cool $2 million or more.
He didn't get it.
Christopher Torchia
Associated Press
Fri, 19 Feb 2010 22:17 EST
The fallout of war has a price in southern Afghanistan.
U.S. Army units fighting the Taliban in Helmand province have a compensation system for any death, injury or damage to crops and buildings caused by American forces to Afghan civilians and their property.
The suffering of a population caught between combatants during the Afghan war is a politically sensitive issue, and NATO troops have sought to make amends for deadly airstrikes and other instances in which civilians were killed.
In turn, they accuse insurgents of using civilians as human shields, making it harder to distinguish between enemies and innocents. Financial compensation in desperately poor Afghanistan is at least one way to alleviate distress and show good intentions, military commanders say.
The American units carry a list that gives guidance on payouts:
The death of a child or adult is worth $1,500-$2,500, loss of limb and other injuries $600-$1,500, a damaged or destroyed vehicle $500-$2,500, and damage to a farmer's fields $50-$250.
The system is also useful for gathering intelligence on insurgents, says 1st Sgt. Gene Hicks of Tacoma, Washington.
The military pays villagers in local currency for information about the location of roadside bombs as well as "where they've seen people at, where they've seen people moving, where they've seen people shooting from," Hicks said.
His Alpha Company of 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Stryker Brigade has paid out nearly $500 so far, though they also have yet to compensate landowners for compounds they have occupied and turned into patrol bases. They have not had to pay any "condolence" payments for injury or loss of life.
One Afghan landowner stands to reap a windfall because his compound has been occupied by British, Canadian and American troops.
"They've all used the same compound," Hicks said. "So he gets his money from whoever's occupying his compound at the time."
It's not an exact science, but some Afghan civilians in the area of Badula Qulp, northeast of the contested Taliban stronghold of Marjah, have been quick to exploit it. In any casualty case, the Americans are mindful that they might be asked to compensate for the death of an insurgent, rather than a civilian.
"It's really kind of hard," Hicks said. "You have to determine whether the guy was a good guy or a bad guy. It's a benefit of the doubt kind of thing."
A few days ago, a company with the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment got into a firefight with the Taliban, and a helicopter destroyed a mosque from where troops had received fire. The 15-year-old son of the local religious figure died in the air strike; the U.S. military agreed to pay compensation in a meeting with village leaders, though commanders privately speculated that the son might have been a combatant.
At that meeting, one of the elders initially objected to the idea of putting a price on someone's death, or damage to a holy religious site. By the end of the meeting, the elders seemed content with the idea of a payout.
The compensation process requires completed claim forms, and is sometimes complicated by the fact that many villagers don't know how to write and can't sign their names. In that event, soldiers take their fingerprint on the document or photograph them with the form.
During a mission in neighboring Kandahar province, Alpha Company once ran into an enterprising man who showed them where to find a roadside bomb that could have caused serious damage to one of their Stryker infantry carriers. The man wouldn't settle for a few hundred dollars; he wanted the amount of the armored vehicle that had possibly been saved from destruction - a cool $2 million or more.
He didn't get it.
Blackwater guards stole weapons in Kabul and went on deadly rampage
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7040078.ece
The Times
February 25, 2010
Blackwater guards stole weapons in Kabul and went on deadly rampage
Giles Whittell, Washington
Private American security guards working for the US military in Afghanistan removed hundreds of handguns and automatic weapons from stores intended for the exclusive use of the Afghan police and used them on drunken shooting rampages that killed two Afghan civilians and injured at least two more.
The guards included a former US Marine with a criminal record of assault and battery and a former soldier discharged from the US Army after testing positive for cocaine, Congress heard yesterday.
Justin Cannon, Christopher Drotleff and a guard using the name “Eric Cartman” from the cartoon South Park were employees of a subsidiary of the Blackwater Worldwide group, implicated in a litany of extrajudicial shootings since 2003 in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Cannon and Drotleff have been charged with killing two Afghans and injuring a third in an incident last May when they opened fire on a car carrying four civilians in Kabul, while under the influence of alcohol. The men, who were hired to train Afghan soldiers, had no permission from US authorities to carry guns.
The investigation found that more than 500 AK47 rifles had been removed from the bunker by Blackwater staff without permission. Blackwater has been renamed Xe Services since its staff killed 17 civilians in Baghdad in 2007. Its licence in Iraq has been withdrawn by the Iraqi Government.
The Times
February 25, 2010
Blackwater guards stole weapons in Kabul and went on deadly rampage
Giles Whittell, Washington
Private American security guards working for the US military in Afghanistan removed hundreds of handguns and automatic weapons from stores intended for the exclusive use of the Afghan police and used them on drunken shooting rampages that killed two Afghan civilians and injured at least two more.
The guards included a former US Marine with a criminal record of assault and battery and a former soldier discharged from the US Army after testing positive for cocaine, Congress heard yesterday.
Justin Cannon, Christopher Drotleff and a guard using the name “Eric Cartman” from the cartoon South Park were employees of a subsidiary of the Blackwater Worldwide group, implicated in a litany of extrajudicial shootings since 2003 in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Cannon and Drotleff have been charged with killing two Afghans and injuring a third in an incident last May when they opened fire on a car carrying four civilians in Kabul, while under the influence of alcohol. The men, who were hired to train Afghan soldiers, had no permission from US authorities to carry guns.
The investigation found that more than 500 AK47 rifles had been removed from the bunker by Blackwater staff without permission. Blackwater has been renamed Xe Services since its staff killed 17 civilians in Baghdad in 2007. Its licence in Iraq has been withdrawn by the Iraqi Government.
US Steps Deeper Into Afghan Quagmire
http://rense.com/general89/stes.htm
US Steps Deeper Into Afghan Quagmire
By Joel Skousen
Editor - World Affairs Brief
2-27-10
Begin Excerpt
With the ongoing attack on Marjah, the US military began its first major assault on a Taliban controlled town in Afghanistan and simultaneously entered a new and expanded phase of the war. The resulting military victory was predictable but the side effects of civilian casualties and property destruction won't allow the coalition forces to win any local "hearts and minds," nor increase the acceptability of the Karzai regime. ''
Gareth Porter writes about the political motives behind the choice of target. "The primary goal of the offensive, they write, is to 'convince Americans that a new era has arrived in the eight-year long war...' U.S. military officials in Afghanistan 'hope a large and loud victory in Marjah will convince the American public that they deserve more time to demonstrate that extra troops and new tactics can yield better results on the battlefield.' Some advisers to Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force, told him last June that Kandahar City is far more important strategically than Marjah," But that city would be far too difficult to tackle. ''
Astute scholar and commentator Juan Cole poses four important questions about this latest Afghan Surge; "Gen. David Petraeus admitted on Meet the Press Sunday that the Afghanistan War will take years and incur high casualties... The Marjah Campaign, the centerpiece of the new counter-insurgency strategy, is over a week old, and some assessment of this new, visible push by the US military in violent Helmand Province is in order. The questions are:''
"1. Can the stategy of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, of taking, clearing, holding and building be extended deep into the Pashtun regions? Marjah is only a stepping stone to the key southern city of Qandahar, which has a population of a million, more the size of Detroit. This outcome has yet to be seen. But for rural Pashtuns to come to love foreign occupiers is an unlikely proposition. Even the WSJ admits that in Marjah, the Marines are not exactly feeling the love from the civilians they have supposedly just liberated. Since the Taliban are typically not as corrupt as the warlords, in fact, to any extent that the US and NATO re-install corrupt warlord types in power, they may alienate the locals. And keeping civilian casualties low so as to win hearts and minds is key here [and failing rapidly]. That task will become more difficult as the US inserts itself more deeply into Pashtun territory, since insurgent villages will have to be defeated. A campaign in Qandahar could easily displace half a million people, and they might mind. Meanwhile, on Monday, the governor of Dai Kundi asserted that a US airstrike killed 27 persons, mostly civilians. There is also the question, raised by Tom Englehardt, of whether the US is capable of good governance in Afghanistan when it is not in Washington, DC.''
"2. Can the demonstration of vitality and of a sense of progress mollify NATO publics long enough to fight a prolonged war and do intensive training of troops and police over several years? No. Over the weekend, the center-right government of the Netherlands fell over whether to keep Dutch troops in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan war is universally unpopular in continental Europe, and governments have troops there mostly in the teeth of popular opposition, because NATO invoked article 5 of its charter, 'an attack on one is an attack on all' with regard to the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001, attacks [which was totally falsified by US intelligence]. Australia is already refusing to take up the Dutch slack, and its government is under public pressure to get out, itself. While it is entirely possible that scandal-plagued rightwing billionaire Silvio Berlusconi will survive the next elections in Italy, it is also possible that he will not, and his successor may well want out of the unpopular Afghanistan quagmire. ''
"3. Can an Afghan army be stood up in short order that has the capacity to patrol independently and keep order after the US and NATO troops withdraw? Unlikely. The answer to the question about Afghan military preparedness-- after nearly a decade of training and an investment of $1 billion that Afghan troops are not ready for prime time. In the Marjah campaign, they showed no initiative, no ability to fight independently. They are poorly served by their junior field officers, and they are 90% illiterate. There is often bad blood between Tajiks and Pashtuns, the group that predominates in Marjah. The same skill set of the ANA most prized by the US Marines during the assault-- the ability to sniff out which households are Taliban-- may be a liability in the holding and building phase, since it stems from a decade and a half of Tajik Northern Alliance battles against the Taliban.''
"4. Can the Afghan public, which includes many groups (Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks) deeply harmed by Taliban rule, accept reconciliation, as well? Unlikely. Former Northern Alliance leader popular among Tajiks, Abdullah Abdullah, warned Karzai against reconciling with the Taliban this weekend. Abdullah dropped out of last fall's presidential contest in protest against alleged ballot fraud in Karzai's favor. There is general hostility toward reconciliation with the Taliban among the parties representing northern, non-Pashtun ethnic groups. [Karzai has damaged his credibility further by taking personal control of the electoral watchdog council that overseas election fairness] ''
Next it is important to consider how crucial are US and Pakistani successes in capturing and killing major Taliban leaders. Bill Roggio gives a summary of the latest apprehensions: "The Christian Science Monitor is reporting that four additional members of the Afghan Taliban's Quetta Shura have been captured. And one of them may be none other than Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir, the former Guantanamo Bay detainee who serves as the leader of one of the four regional military shuras. According to the Monitor." This brings up the question of why did the US let Zakir go while holding others that are not much threat at all?''
The capture of Taliban leaders has had one predictable effect which may further success more difficult. "Top US defense officials briefed Congress about the move of the Afghan Taliban's top council, the Quetta Shura, from Quetta to Karachi. 'Elements of the Afghan Taliban high command are beginning to relocate from Quetta to Karachi, due in large part to drone attacks,' said Lt. Gen. John Paxton, director for operations at the US Joint Chiefs of Staff." This obviously makes it more difficult to target other senior Taliban leaders. Karachi is a very large city of some 3 million inhabitants, mostly Pashtuns.''
The capturing of terrorist leaders goes both ways. This latest one will prove embarrassing to the US and its covert operations inside Iran working to overthrow the existing government. Asia Times M K Bhadrakumar has the story: "It was the morning after the dramatic capture of the 31-year-old leader of the dreaded Pakistan-based terrorist group Jundallah, Abdulmalik Rigi, in a stunning operation by Iranian intelligence. In turn, that would have implications for the United States-Iran standoff. But that is only one aspect. The fact is that Tehran has put Washington on the back foot at a critical juncture. Rigi is bound to spill the beans - he may already have begun - and much is going to surface about the covert activities by the US forces based in Afghanistan to subvert Iran by hobnobbing with Jundallah, which, incidentally, is also known to have links with al-Qaeda. Rigi apparently had a meeting with his US mentors in an American base just a day before his journey to the UAE. It seems he was traveling with a fake Afghan passport provided by the Americans. A lot of highly embarrassing details are trickling in already that will be eagerly lapped up by the so-called 'Arab street' and which will make the entire American position on the situation around Iran look rather weak." --Unless the story never gets much press in America, which is rather certain.''
End Excerpt
World Affairs Brief - Commentary and Insights on a Troubled World
Copyright Joel Skousen. Partial quotations with attribution permitted.
Cite source as Joel Skousen's World Affairs Brief http://www.worldaffairsbrief.com
World Affairs Brief, 290 West 580 South, Orem, Ut 84058, USA
US Steps Deeper Into Afghan Quagmire
By Joel Skousen
Editor - World Affairs Brief
2-27-10
Begin Excerpt
With the ongoing attack on Marjah, the US military began its first major assault on a Taliban controlled town in Afghanistan and simultaneously entered a new and expanded phase of the war. The resulting military victory was predictable but the side effects of civilian casualties and property destruction won't allow the coalition forces to win any local "hearts and minds," nor increase the acceptability of the Karzai regime. ''
Gareth Porter writes about the political motives behind the choice of target. "The primary goal of the offensive, they write, is to 'convince Americans that a new era has arrived in the eight-year long war...' U.S. military officials in Afghanistan 'hope a large and loud victory in Marjah will convince the American public that they deserve more time to demonstrate that extra troops and new tactics can yield better results on the battlefield.' Some advisers to Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force, told him last June that Kandahar City is far more important strategically than Marjah," But that city would be far too difficult to tackle. ''
Astute scholar and commentator Juan Cole poses four important questions about this latest Afghan Surge; "Gen. David Petraeus admitted on Meet the Press Sunday that the Afghanistan War will take years and incur high casualties... The Marjah Campaign, the centerpiece of the new counter-insurgency strategy, is over a week old, and some assessment of this new, visible push by the US military in violent Helmand Province is in order. The questions are:''
"1. Can the stategy of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, of taking, clearing, holding and building be extended deep into the Pashtun regions? Marjah is only a stepping stone to the key southern city of Qandahar, which has a population of a million, more the size of Detroit. This outcome has yet to be seen. But for rural Pashtuns to come to love foreign occupiers is an unlikely proposition. Even the WSJ admits that in Marjah, the Marines are not exactly feeling the love from the civilians they have supposedly just liberated. Since the Taliban are typically not as corrupt as the warlords, in fact, to any extent that the US and NATO re-install corrupt warlord types in power, they may alienate the locals. And keeping civilian casualties low so as to win hearts and minds is key here [and failing rapidly]. That task will become more difficult as the US inserts itself more deeply into Pashtun territory, since insurgent villages will have to be defeated. A campaign in Qandahar could easily displace half a million people, and they might mind. Meanwhile, on Monday, the governor of Dai Kundi asserted that a US airstrike killed 27 persons, mostly civilians. There is also the question, raised by Tom Englehardt, of whether the US is capable of good governance in Afghanistan when it is not in Washington, DC.''
"2. Can the demonstration of vitality and of a sense of progress mollify NATO publics long enough to fight a prolonged war and do intensive training of troops and police over several years? No. Over the weekend, the center-right government of the Netherlands fell over whether to keep Dutch troops in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan war is universally unpopular in continental Europe, and governments have troops there mostly in the teeth of popular opposition, because NATO invoked article 5 of its charter, 'an attack on one is an attack on all' with regard to the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan after the September 11, 2001, attacks [which was totally falsified by US intelligence]. Australia is already refusing to take up the Dutch slack, and its government is under public pressure to get out, itself. While it is entirely possible that scandal-plagued rightwing billionaire Silvio Berlusconi will survive the next elections in Italy, it is also possible that he will not, and his successor may well want out of the unpopular Afghanistan quagmire. ''
"3. Can an Afghan army be stood up in short order that has the capacity to patrol independently and keep order after the US and NATO troops withdraw? Unlikely. The answer to the question about Afghan military preparedness-- after nearly a decade of training and an investment of $1 billion that Afghan troops are not ready for prime time. In the Marjah campaign, they showed no initiative, no ability to fight independently. They are poorly served by their junior field officers, and they are 90% illiterate. There is often bad blood between Tajiks and Pashtuns, the group that predominates in Marjah. The same skill set of the ANA most prized by the US Marines during the assault-- the ability to sniff out which households are Taliban-- may be a liability in the holding and building phase, since it stems from a decade and a half of Tajik Northern Alliance battles against the Taliban.''
"4. Can the Afghan public, which includes many groups (Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks) deeply harmed by Taliban rule, accept reconciliation, as well? Unlikely. Former Northern Alliance leader popular among Tajiks, Abdullah Abdullah, warned Karzai against reconciling with the Taliban this weekend. Abdullah dropped out of last fall's presidential contest in protest against alleged ballot fraud in Karzai's favor. There is general hostility toward reconciliation with the Taliban among the parties representing northern, non-Pashtun ethnic groups. [Karzai has damaged his credibility further by taking personal control of the electoral watchdog council that overseas election fairness] ''
Next it is important to consider how crucial are US and Pakistani successes in capturing and killing major Taliban leaders. Bill Roggio gives a summary of the latest apprehensions: "The Christian Science Monitor is reporting that four additional members of the Afghan Taliban's Quetta Shura have been captured. And one of them may be none other than Mullah Abdul Qayum Zakir, the former Guantanamo Bay detainee who serves as the leader of one of the four regional military shuras. According to the Monitor." This brings up the question of why did the US let Zakir go while holding others that are not much threat at all?''
The capture of Taliban leaders has had one predictable effect which may further success more difficult. "Top US defense officials briefed Congress about the move of the Afghan Taliban's top council, the Quetta Shura, from Quetta to Karachi. 'Elements of the Afghan Taliban high command are beginning to relocate from Quetta to Karachi, due in large part to drone attacks,' said Lt. Gen. John Paxton, director for operations at the US Joint Chiefs of Staff." This obviously makes it more difficult to target other senior Taliban leaders. Karachi is a very large city of some 3 million inhabitants, mostly Pashtuns.''
The capturing of terrorist leaders goes both ways. This latest one will prove embarrassing to the US and its covert operations inside Iran working to overthrow the existing government. Asia Times M K Bhadrakumar has the story: "It was the morning after the dramatic capture of the 31-year-old leader of the dreaded Pakistan-based terrorist group Jundallah, Abdulmalik Rigi, in a stunning operation by Iranian intelligence. In turn, that would have implications for the United States-Iran standoff. But that is only one aspect. The fact is that Tehran has put Washington on the back foot at a critical juncture. Rigi is bound to spill the beans - he may already have begun - and much is going to surface about the covert activities by the US forces based in Afghanistan to subvert Iran by hobnobbing with Jundallah, which, incidentally, is also known to have links with al-Qaeda. Rigi apparently had a meeting with his US mentors in an American base just a day before his journey to the UAE. It seems he was traveling with a fake Afghan passport provided by the Americans. A lot of highly embarrassing details are trickling in already that will be eagerly lapped up by the so-called 'Arab street' and which will make the entire American position on the situation around Iran look rather weak." --Unless the story never gets much press in America, which is rather certain.''
End Excerpt
World Affairs Brief - Commentary and Insights on a Troubled World
Copyright Joel Skousen. Partial quotations with attribution permitted.
Cite source as Joel Skousen's World Affairs Brief http://www.worldaffairsbrief.com
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Nato Admits That Deaths of 8 Boys Were a Mistake
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article7040166.ece
Clockwise from top left: Sebhanullah, 17; Attahullah, 15; Rahimullah, 17; Matiullah, 16; guest Samar Gul, 12; Ismael, 12; Atiqullah, 15; and (not shown) Samiullah, 12
Jerome Starkey
The Times
Thu, 25 Feb 2010 23:02 EST
A night-time raid in eastern Afghanistan in which eight schoolboys from one family were killed was carried out on the basis of faulty intelligence and should never have been authorized, a Times investigation has found.
Ten children and teenagers died when troops stormed a remote mountain compound near the border with Pakistan in December.
At the time, Nato claimed that the assault force was targeting a "known insurgent group responsible for a series of violent attacks". Officials said that the victims were involved in making and smuggling improvised explosive devices. But Western sources close to the case now agree that the victims were all aged 12 to 18 and were not involved in insurgent activity.
When reports of the raid first surfaced eight weeks ago, The Times contacted the police chief in Kunar province and then the boys' head-master and uncle, Rahman Jan Ehsas.
Two men whose children and other relatives were killed agreed to come to Kabul to describe the incident. They provided pictures of their dead sons, a sketched map of the compound and copies of the compensation claim forms signed by local officials detailing their sons' names, relatives and positions at school. Their story was supported by Western military sources.
Farooq Abdul Ajan, who lost two sons, two brothers, three nephews and a cousin in the raid, said that the soldiers had had no idea whom they were killing. Afghan investigators, local officials and MPs from the province all maintain that the boys were innocent.
Nato's statement, issued four days after the event, said that troops were attacked "from several buildings" as they entered the village. Yesterday it said that ultimately, we did determine this to be a civilian casualty incident".
Anger is growing over civilian casualties. General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander, has warned that Nato risks "strategic defeat" by causing civilian deaths. The Independent Human Rights Commission said that more than 63 civilians had died in the past two weeks, including 27 killed when US special forces ordered an airstrike on a convoy of minibuses in the central Daikundi province. Nato recently introduced a new tactical directive to limit the use of night raids, the coalition's chief legal adviser, Colonel Richard Gross, said. "General McChrystal realised that this was one of the areas where we had to change the way we do business, or else we would not win this war," he said.
Exactly who carried out the Narang raid is unclear. Colonel Gross said that US forces were present but did not lead the operation. Nato insists that the troops were not part of the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf). US forces based in Kunar denied any knowledge of the raid.
Senior Western officers have hinted that the "trigger pullers" were Afghan; the Afghan Defence Ministry said its troops were not involved. Mohammed Afzal, Narang's district police chief, insisted that US special forces were involved. Assadullah Wafa, who led an Afghan investigation into the incident, said that relatives would get $2,000 compensation for each person killed.
Clockwise from top left: Sebhanullah, 17; Attahullah, 15; Rahimullah, 17; Matiullah, 16; guest Samar Gul, 12; Ismael, 12; Atiqullah, 15; and (not shown) Samiullah, 12Jerome Starkey
The Times
Thu, 25 Feb 2010 23:02 EST
A night-time raid in eastern Afghanistan in which eight schoolboys from one family were killed was carried out on the basis of faulty intelligence and should never have been authorized, a Times investigation has found.
Ten children and teenagers died when troops stormed a remote mountain compound near the border with Pakistan in December.
At the time, Nato claimed that the assault force was targeting a "known insurgent group responsible for a series of violent attacks". Officials said that the victims were involved in making and smuggling improvised explosive devices. But Western sources close to the case now agree that the victims were all aged 12 to 18 and were not involved in insurgent activity.
When reports of the raid first surfaced eight weeks ago, The Times contacted the police chief in Kunar province and then the boys' head-master and uncle, Rahman Jan Ehsas.
Two men whose children and other relatives were killed agreed to come to Kabul to describe the incident. They provided pictures of their dead sons, a sketched map of the compound and copies of the compensation claim forms signed by local officials detailing their sons' names, relatives and positions at school. Their story was supported by Western military sources.
Farooq Abdul Ajan, who lost two sons, two brothers, three nephews and a cousin in the raid, said that the soldiers had had no idea whom they were killing. Afghan investigators, local officials and MPs from the province all maintain that the boys were innocent.
Nato's statement, issued four days after the event, said that troops were attacked "from several buildings" as they entered the village. Yesterday it said that ultimately, we did determine this to be a civilian casualty incident".
Anger is growing over civilian casualties. General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander, has warned that Nato risks "strategic defeat" by causing civilian deaths. The Independent Human Rights Commission said that more than 63 civilians had died in the past two weeks, including 27 killed when US special forces ordered an airstrike on a convoy of minibuses in the central Daikundi province. Nato recently introduced a new tactical directive to limit the use of night raids, the coalition's chief legal adviser, Colonel Richard Gross, said. "General McChrystal realised that this was one of the areas where we had to change the way we do business, or else we would not win this war," he said.
Exactly who carried out the Narang raid is unclear. Colonel Gross said that US forces were present but did not lead the operation. Nato insists that the troops were not part of the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf). US forces based in Kunar denied any knowledge of the raid.
Senior Western officers have hinted that the "trigger pullers" were Afghan; the Afghan Defence Ministry said its troops were not involved. Mohammed Afzal, Narang's district police chief, insisted that US special forces were involved. Assadullah Wafa, who led an Afghan investigation into the incident, said that relatives would get $2,000 compensation for each person killed.
Monday, February 22, 2010
The Warlord's Tune
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2010/s2824501.htm
"A documentary that tells how thousands of young Afghani boys are now being hunted and groomed to become sex slaves."
The Warlord's Tune
Reporter: Jamie Doran and Clover Films
Broadcast: 22/02/2010
Over six months an Afghani journalist, Najibullah Quraishi, has risked his life to document the practice of Bacha Bazi (boy play), where young men are forced into prostitution serving the needs of rich and powerful men.
The filmmaker follows those who make a living procuring young boys, and those who abuse them. The result is a deeply disturbing portrait of a society that publicly promotes a strict moral code while effectively condoning systematic child abuse.
Imagine being nine or ten years old. You are orphaned and living on the streets of a city in Afghanistan. You are approached by a man you do not know. He will clothe, feed and "protect" you. All you must do is learn to dance.
At first you will practice your routine with another young man. After weeks of training you will make your debut dancing before a crowd of men. Many are former warlords who helped the Karzai Government make its way to power. Others might be powerful businessmen.
Before you dance you will be given clothes and make up to make you look feminine. After the dancing, the men are excited and they bid for your company. If you please a warlord or businessman they will pay highly for your favours. Ultimately you will be traded, violated and abused by a large number of men.
This is the world of the Bacha Bereesh, which means "beardless boys". These children are groomed to become sex slaves. It is not a new practice. In Afghanistan the Warlords often kept young boys as their sexual partners. But in modern Afghanistan the practice has evolved into a lucrative and expanding business. In a country ravaged by war orphaned boys are being openly targeted by paedophiles. Some families are so poor that they are willing to sell their sons into slavery. Official reports now suggest thousands of children are at risk.
For the first time on television this practice is finally exposed. A locally born reporter has taken a camera and gone inside the world of the dancing boys. He goes with the "protector" as this man buys children. The reporter is told how the boys are trained and he is told how the "protector" will rent them out and take his "cut".
The documentary finds evidence that this practice is not confined to any one area of Afghanistan. Although it is popular in the north it is now spreading across the country.
The investigation also shows what happens when the boys mature or fall out of favour with the men who desire them. Some are abandoned, others are killed. Asked what impact this life has on the boys, one local says: "They are just boys, they will forget about it."
It is an investigation that has a special resonance for anyone watching in Australia. The people committing the abuse on these children are powerful figures in Afghan society. They are given license to commit these criminal acts by the very governments that are supposed to be our allies in the war on terror and the lethal contest against the Taliban.
"The Warlord's Tune" is produced and scripted by award winning documentary maker Jamie Doran.
It goes to air on Four Corners on Monday 22nd February at 8.30pm on ABC1. It is repeated on Tuesday 23rd at 11.35pm. Also available online.
"A documentary that tells how thousands of young Afghani boys are now being hunted and groomed to become sex slaves."
The Warlord's Tune
Reporter: Jamie Doran and Clover Films
Broadcast: 22/02/2010
Over six months an Afghani journalist, Najibullah Quraishi, has risked his life to document the practice of Bacha Bazi (boy play), where young men are forced into prostitution serving the needs of rich and powerful men.
The filmmaker follows those who make a living procuring young boys, and those who abuse them. The result is a deeply disturbing portrait of a society that publicly promotes a strict moral code while effectively condoning systematic child abuse.
Imagine being nine or ten years old. You are orphaned and living on the streets of a city in Afghanistan. You are approached by a man you do not know. He will clothe, feed and "protect" you. All you must do is learn to dance.
At first you will practice your routine with another young man. After weeks of training you will make your debut dancing before a crowd of men. Many are former warlords who helped the Karzai Government make its way to power. Others might be powerful businessmen.
Before you dance you will be given clothes and make up to make you look feminine. After the dancing, the men are excited and they bid for your company. If you please a warlord or businessman they will pay highly for your favours. Ultimately you will be traded, violated and abused by a large number of men.
This is the world of the Bacha Bereesh, which means "beardless boys". These children are groomed to become sex slaves. It is not a new practice. In Afghanistan the Warlords often kept young boys as their sexual partners. But in modern Afghanistan the practice has evolved into a lucrative and expanding business. In a country ravaged by war orphaned boys are being openly targeted by paedophiles. Some families are so poor that they are willing to sell their sons into slavery. Official reports now suggest thousands of children are at risk.
For the first time on television this practice is finally exposed. A locally born reporter has taken a camera and gone inside the world of the dancing boys. He goes with the "protector" as this man buys children. The reporter is told how the boys are trained and he is told how the "protector" will rent them out and take his "cut".
The documentary finds evidence that this practice is not confined to any one area of Afghanistan. Although it is popular in the north it is now spreading across the country.
The investigation also shows what happens when the boys mature or fall out of favour with the men who desire them. Some are abandoned, others are killed. Asked what impact this life has on the boys, one local says: "They are just boys, they will forget about it."
It is an investigation that has a special resonance for anyone watching in Australia. The people committing the abuse on these children are powerful figures in Afghan society. They are given license to commit these criminal acts by the very governments that are supposed to be our allies in the war on terror and the lethal contest against the Taliban.
"The Warlord's Tune" is produced and scripted by award winning documentary maker Jamie Doran.
It goes to air on Four Corners on Monday 22nd February at 8.30pm on ABC1. It is repeated on Tuesday 23rd at 11.35pm. Also available online.
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